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Abstract
An influential theoretical hypothesis holds that if aggregate productivity growth
accelerates, then so does the decline in energy intensity. Whether faster growth
is greener in this sense is crucial for modeling future growth and climate change
mitigation, but empirical evidence is lacking. This paper characterizes the global,
long-run historical relationship between changes in energy intensity and labor pro-
ductivity growth rates. Basing estimates on an unbalanced panel of 180 countries
for the period 1950-2014 and the world as a whole, it captures a significantly larger
historical window than previous studies. The paper finds a stylized fact whereby
the rate at which energy intensity changes is constant or even increases as labor
productivity accelerates. Faster growth is not greener. This provides important
new information for calibrating integrated assessment models, many of which make
a green growth assumption in near term projections.
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1 Introduction
Is faster growth greener? This question connects two key global challenges of our time.
The first is to lift billions of humans out of poverty and reduce material deprivation.
The second is to avoid catastrophic climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions. The main mechanism underpinning e↵orts to meet the first challenge
is robust and inclusive economic growth to raise incomes (G20, 2017; UN, 2018). A
key mechanism to meet the second is to reduce energy demand because greenhouse gas
emissions are predominantly caused by combustion of fossil fuels to meet energy demand
(Clarke et al., 2014; IEA, 2015a; UNEP, 2016).1 Mitigating climate change is intrinsically
in the interest of long term growth, because global warming and its consequences would
damage global growth potential (Burke et al., 2015). Reasoning in the other direction
is less straightforward. Historically, economic growth has been tightly correlated with
increases in energy demand, so economic growth tends to increase the greenhouse e↵ect.
If, however, faster growth was correlated with the rate at which output growth decouples
from energy demand, this would be an important factor in making progress towards
addressing both challenges.
An influential theoretical hypothesis holds that if aggregate productivity growth ac-
celerates, then so does the decline in energy intensity (energy used per unit value of
output produced). The reasoning behind this argues that older and less energy-e cient
technologies would be replaced faster with newer, more e cient ones, and hence the
energy intensity is falling faster. This intuitively appealing claim, which is based on
the vintage model of embodied technical change (Solow, 1960), implies that faster pro-
ductivity growth itself delivers faster climate change mitigation conditional on growing
incomes. Conversely, it implies that slower productivity growth detracts simultaneously
from meeting both the income and mitigation targets. This “green growth hypothesis”
thus proposes that the goal of poverty reduction can be reached faster, while at the same
1Depending on conversion ratios used to compare heat and electricity forms of energy, and treatment
of non-commercial energy, fossil fuels were estimated to supply around 80-85% of the world’s primary
energy in recent years (British Petroleum, 2017; Energy Information Agency, 2018; IEA, 2017), a ratio
that has changed little since 1950 (Fouquet, 2009).
2
time using relatively less energy and making headway towards the climate mitigation
target – a win-win situation.
The accuracy of this hypothesis is important for understanding whether economic
growth may undermine its own basis via climate change (Taylor, 2009). This is high-
lighted by current integrated assessment models that chart scenarios of future growth
and climate change for the regions of the world. In these models the crucial relation for
the feasibility of climate change mitigation conditional on growth is the output elasticity
of energy (Marangoni et al., 2017). These models typically produce an uptick in near
future projected global productivity growth rates due to convergence of poorer regions
with richer ones (Dellink et al., 2017; W. D. Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). If the green
growth hypothesis holds, then convergence also induces faster decoupling and lessens
the greenhouse gas emissions of growth. Bringing the models to the data in the growth-
energy demand dimension is particularly important as more sophisticated accounts of
technological change, relying on, machine varieties, learning rates and R&D expenditures
are more di cult to validate empirically (Gillingham, Newell, et al., 2008), especially
at the global level, the level that counts for the global challenges of growth and climate
change.
Against this backdrop, it is surprising that little empirical work has investigated the
green growth hypothesis. Energy intensity has tended to fall at the global level since the
second half of the 20th century, but it is unclear whether faster growth would accelerate
this reduction. Most empirical studies focus on nonlinearities in the levels relationship
of output per capita and energy intensity or energy per capita due to the environmental
Kuznets curve argument applied to energy (Ang and Liu, 2006; Kander et al., 2013;
Luzzati and Orsini, 2009), household consumption patterns (Wolfram et al., 2012) or
energy policies (Fouquet, 2016), but not on changes in growth rates. The careful study
on stylized facts of energy in economic growth by Csereklyei et al. (2016) goes some way
towards elucidating the correlation of the rates of change. They find that in a long-run
cross section of compound annual growth rates for 99 countries over the years 1971-2010,
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energy intensity falls more quickly when productivity growth accelerates (an elasticity of
around -0.3). However, the authors give the same weight to each observation with e.g.
Singapore’s position having the same influence as China’s on the slope of the regression
line. This is useful for international comparisons, but less so for understanding the
global trajectory of energy intensity and growth. Moreover, they do not examine any
variation within their 40 year cross section, nor a country’s own elasticity as it increases
or decreases its rate of productivity growth over time. Finally, although their dataset
comprises 99 countries, they leave out the entire Soviet Union and its successor states,
surely a component that must not miss due to its pivotal role in economic growth and
energy demand in the 20th century.2
Empirical evidence for whether faster growth is greener is lacking, and current model-
ing relies mainly on a theoretically motivated prior. The present paper fills this gap and
characterizes the global, long-run historical relationship between changes in the rates
of change of productivity and energy demand. It goes beyond existing studies in three
key aspects. Basing estimates on an unbalanced panel of 180 countries for the period
1950-2014, this research captures a significantly larger historical window than previous
studies. Taking country size into account, it looks at global patterns, not just interna-
tional comparisons. By tracing individual countries as well as the world as a whole for
their own elasticity over time, this research moves beyond pooled cross sections. The
aim is to provide robust insight into the relationship of productivity and energy de-
mand changes, as this stylized fact is a crucial parameter in the debates about economic
growth, energy demand and climate change.
This paper analyses a more comprehensive dataset than in greater detail than any
previous study of the author’s knowledge, and updates our prior about decoupling as
productivity growth varies. The key finding is that the green growth hypothesis does not
hold water: faster growth is not greener. Moreover, it is shown that the current suite of
2Some other noteworthy omissions, that are included in the present study, are Yugoslavia and its
successor states, Myanmar, several African countries, the more populous of which are Burkina Faso,
Chad, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, and a suite of Middle Eastern countries,
namely Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
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integrated assessment models used to inform climate policy tends to assume the refuted
hypothesis to hold in near term projections of economic growth and energy demand, so
this research provides new information for calibrating these models.
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Prior to starting the empirical analysis, it is useful to demonstrate how widespread
the green growth hypothesis is, trace it to an underlying theoretical argument about
embodied technical change, and to review extant empirical evidence.
2.1 Green Growth in the Modelling Literature
The green growth hypothesis, although not always spelled out explicity, is widespread
in models of growth with energy. For instance, the latest assessment report of the
International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), assumes that faster labor productivity
growth coincides with faster decline in energy intensity (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 426). A
similar assumption can be found in the BP Energy Outlook (British Petroleum, 2018,
p. 120), and in the two transition scenarios of the World Energy Council (2016, Tables
21 and 30), in all of which output per capita grows and energy intensity declines at
accelerated rates over historical averages. In fact, Semieniuk et al. (2018) show that in
most current models, whether baseline or policy scenarios, the green growth hypothesis
plays an important role.
Many scenarios are not explicit about the rationale for this elasticity. More insight
comes from earlier generations of models. For instance, the first IPCC assessment report
argues that “a higher rate of economic growth makes it possible for capital stocks (e.g.,
power plants, factories, housing) to be refurbished or replaced more quickly, and makes
the accelerated penetration of advanced technologies possible” (IPCC, 1991, p. 38) and
a publication widely cited in later models assumes for its energy projection “the faster
the economic growth, the higher the turnover of capital and the greater the nergy in-
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tensity improvements (Nakicenovic et al., 1998, p. 37). In fact, this refers to the theory
of embodied technical change from the lat 1950s, whereby productivity growth occurs
by installing newer, more productive vintages of capital (Johansen, 1959; Salter, 1960;
Solow, 1960). Assuming new vintages of capital to be more energy e cient, accelerated
productivity growth also implies faster energy e ciency growth (Jin and Zhang, 2016;
Zon and Yetkiner, 2003). Embodied technical change is a common of incorporating tech-
nical change into models of growth with energy and climate change (Gillingham, Newell,
et al., 2008; Popp, 2010) and perhaps the most direct theoretical justification for the
green growth hypothesis.3 How is the evidence for it causing green growth?
2.2 Embodied intensity reductions
The period of scarce oil and high oil prices in the 1970s and 80s (more on which in the
results section) generated considerable interest in the problem of energy e cient embod-
ied technical change (Berndt et al., 1993), and there have since been industry specific
studies of it. Worrell and Biermans (2005) find that new vintages and retrofitting of US
electric arc furnaces account for more than 90 percent of energy e ciency increases in the
sector. In the cement sector Worrell, Martin, et al. (2000) reason capital stock turnover
to be an important component of energy e ciency improvements, and (Sterner, 1990)
show that capital-embodied technical change is the most important reason for energy
e ciency improvements in the Mexican cement industry. A study for 35 US industries
finds replacement of quasi-fixed inputs, in particular vehicles, to contribute to US en-
ergy e ciency since the 1980s (Sue Wing, 2008) and energy intensity reductions through
embodied technical change are also to be found important in international technology
adoption (Majumdar and Kar, 2017).4 Considerable additional savings are possible
(Worrell, Bernstein, et al., 2009). In fact, it has been estimated that if all practical
3A recent analytical contribution using Romer’s (1990) expanding variety theory is Lennox and
Witajewski-Baltvilks (2017).
4A related argument about technology-leapfrogging proposes that countries that catch up to the
technological frontier should see less energy intensity growth throughout due to more energy e cient
technology adoption (Goldemberg, 1998). This is not borne out by evidence (Benthem, 2015).
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e ciency improvements in current energy consumption were used (down to 2nd Law of
Thermodynamics lower bounds), energy demand would fall to 15% of its current level
(Cullen, Allwood, and Borgstein, 2011). This figure falls further to 11% for energy con-
version devices, such as equipment in factories (Cullen and Allwood, 2010). In all, little
doubt exists that embodied technical progress is important for energy e ciency changes.
However, no empirical studies were found that consider its correlation with changes in
the (aggregate) rate of growth.
These results are qualified by the old observation that aggregate energy intensity is
not the inverse of per unit energy e ciency (Jevons, 1865). Due to substitution e↵ects,
more energy-e ciently and thus more cheaply produced products may be consumed
more by consumers, and an income e↵ect may lead to additional purchase of energy
intensive products, thus raising energy demand. These direct and indirect “rebound
e↵ects” explain why part of energy e ciency savings from capital-embodied technical
change may be lost (Gillingham, Rapson, et al., 2016; Sorrell et al., 2009). An example
is increased driving per person as cars become more fuel e cient; in the UK a one percent
increase in fuel e ciency has led to an average increase of a quarter percent of distance
driven (Stapleton et al., 2017). While energy e ciency thus grows by one percent, energy
intensity only drops by three quarters of a percent. However, as with the previous set of
studies no empirical studies were found that relate the rebound’s magnitude to growth
– in particular whether it becomes smaller as productivity growth picks up, thus serving
as theoretical cause of green growth. In sum, there is little empirical evidence for the
green growth hypothesis in terms of the underlying replacement of capital stock.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
This leaves us with evidence directly about the correlation between aggregate rates of
change. The empirical literature on economic growth and energy demand has largely
studied correlations of levels, not rates of change. However, there are exceptions. Han-
nesson (2002) finds a strong positive correlation between growth in energy and GDP in
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plots for 171 countries for the period 1950-1997. Hannesson (2009) further finds a GDP
growth rate elasticity of the rate of energy growth of 0.84 and with an intercept of +4.6
percentage points (meaning a stagnating country is predicted to have a quickly growing
EI) in a cross section of 67 countries for 1950-2004. The author controls for level of GDP
per capita (negative insignificant) and oil price (negative significant); the fit is poor
(R2 = 0.09). Ocampo et al. (2009) report a labor productivity growth rate elasticity of
the rate of energy-labor ratio growth rate of 0.4 and 0.6 for 47 countries grouped into 12
regions for 1979-1990 and 1990-2004 respectively. The most recent and comprehensive
attempt is by Csereklyei et al. (2016) (see introduction). Their findings on growth rates
correlations show that on average for 99 countries over 1971-2010 the elasticity of energy
intensity rate of change with respect to output per capita growth rate is roughly one
third (estimated from the plot in their Figure 6). All of these studies therefore seem
to support the green growth hypothesis. But all of them also have in common that
they leave out a number of important countries, do not distinguish (many) time periods
and their relationship, and do not account for the di↵erent weights of countries in the
world’s relationship between energy and growth. In sum, good evidence on green growth
is lacking, and the incorporation into models is predicated largely on a theoretical prior.
2.4 Updating our prior
The aim of this paper is to characterize the correlation of changes in growth rates of
output and energy for the world economy and thus update our theoretical preconception
with data. In short, we are looking for a stylized fact. There are a number of equiv-
alent ways of doing this. In order to stress the idea that changes in energy intensity
hang together with changes in production (productivity growth), we start from models
of economic growth that consider the relationship between labor productivity and the
capital-labor ratio. In those models, if the capital-labor ratio grows, economic growth
is said to be capital deepening, as successive techniques of production use more capital
for every unit of labor employed, with concomitant e↵ects on the capital-output ratio
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(Burmeister and Dobell, 1970). If we replace capital with energy, then energy intensity,
z, which is just the energy-output ratio. E/X, depends on the relationship between la-
bor productivity, x, and the energy-labor ratio, e = E/L. To see this decompose energy
intensity
E
X
⌘
✓
X
L
◆ 1
⇥ E
L
() z ⌘ x 1e (1)
Taking logarithmic derivatives gives us the geometric rates of change
zˆ ⌘ eˆ  xˆ (2)
which are the object of our interest. These accounting identities show that the rate of
change in energy intensity is simply the di↵erence between rates of change of productivity
xˆ, and of technique, that is the ratio of input factors, eˆ. In fact, whenever productivity
growth is faster than the rate of energy deepening, relative decoupling of output from
energy use occurs Ocampo et al. (2009).5 This approach also maps – when replacing
labor with population – directly onto the many studies investigating the energy per
capita levels that sustain a certain level of a✏uence.
The question investigated here is whether an increase/decrease, in the growth rate
of labor productivity, xˆ, corresponds to lesser acceleration/deceleration in the rate of
change of the energy-labor ratio, eˆ. If so, then this supports the green growth hypothesis
as this implies a drop in the rate of change of energy intensity, zˆ. Empirically, this
occurs if the elasticity of the energy-labor ratio rate of change with respect to the labor
productivity rate of change (henceforth simply the elasticity) is lower than one. The
magnitude of this elasticity is what the following seeks to establish.6
5Absolute decoupling, Eˆ < 0, occurs when the energy-labor ratio falls faster than labor’s growth
rate, since from zˆ = Eˆ   Xˆ and rearranging (2) we have Eˆ = eˆ+ Lˆ.
6It is important to stress that this paper is not explaining the patterns’ drivers. We must first
understand what the patterns are. The determination of causality is left to subsequent research.
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3 Data and method
3.1 Data Description
The data serves to ground the investigation of the green growth hypothesis in a previously
unavailable dataset that is more comprehensive than previous studies. As a result, a wide
range of data sources have been consulted and merged. The result are historical national
time series of GDP, employment, population, and total and non-residential primary
energy demand at annual frequency for the period 1950-2014 for an unbalanced panel of
180 countries and the world as a whole;7 to confront the stylised fact emerging from the
historical data with near-term projections, data series for 2005, 2010 and 2020 generated
by the models in the IPCC’s 5th assessment report have also been used.
GDP data is from the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015). Market exchange
rates (MER) are used for conversion to a common unit. The alternative would be to
adjust exchange rates to achieve purchasing power parity (PPP). There are arguments
for both types for aggregate exercises (W. D. Nordhaus, 2007; Pant and Fisher, 2007).
We use MER mainly for comparability with extant IAM projections but revise three
additional arguments for why MER are appropriate. First, there is no one right PPP.
Significant changes in per capita incomes between PPP exercises reveal that it is very
di cult to ascertain just what is the right parity (Deaton and Heston, 2008). Second,
our focus is on output growth, much of which is traded at MER, rather than a measure of
welfare. Even from a welfare perspective, the focus only on prices of consumption goods
ignores di↵erences in the consumption environment, where rich countries tend to provide
more public goods that make the mere consumption of non-traded goods incomparable
(Pant and Fisher, 2007). Third, because only long-term compound average growth rates
(10 years) are used here, there are no distortions from short-term speculative fluctuations
in MER. For countries not in the Penn World Table, the following sources were used:
GDP data for the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia for 1950-1990 are from the gdpnapc series
7It’s important to include global rather than sum of national energy demands as the about 2% of
global energy demanded by international aviation and shipping is not attributed to any country.
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in the Maddison project (Bolt et al., 2018). A number of country time series that begin
in 1960 or later in the Penn World Table were spliced with Maddison project data, and,
in a few cases, if not available there, with the Total Economy Database (Conference
Board, 2016). World data was taken from the World Bank for 1960-2014. For 1950-60,
the Maddison data were used, although these are in Geary Khamis dollars, and di↵erent
estimates give diverging growth rates over this period (Institute for Health Metrics and
Evaluation, 2012), so the world data for the 1950s are less reliable.
Total primary energy supply (TPES) was calculated from the United Nations Energy
Statistics (UN, 2016) for 1950-1970 and taken from the IEA (2016) for 1971-2014, and
from the UN for countries not covered by the IEA. The data include non-commercial
energy sources, mainly fuelwood, crop residue, animal waste and charcoal, which have
an important e↵ect on energy intensities, in particular in developing countries (Nilsson,
1993).8 And although it is notoriously di cult to estimate non-commercial energy use
(Ang, 1986), the IEA data include these estimates. To complete the time series back
to 1950, UN Statistics for non-commercial energy were used where available. For many
developing countries, these statistics only begin in 1970 (Nilsson, 1993, p. 313). In
that case, the non-commercial energy share in TPES data was interpolated between the
1970 UN figure and the estimates for 1949 in UN (1952), with additional data points
in between supplied by estimates in (Ang, 1986; Desai, 1978; Planning Commission,
1999). World energy data was taken from Fouquet (2009) for 1950-1970 and the IEA
for 1971-2014. Whenever data was spliced, the IEA series levels were extended. Finally,
subtracting the IEA’s estimate for household energy demand (Residential) from TPES
generates an alternative energy series 1971-2014 that more closely approximates primary
energy demand for production.
Population and employment data were taken from the Penn World Table, and sup-
plemented from the Maddison (only for population) and the Conference Board data in
the same way as for GDP. World population data was retrieved from the United Nations
8For instance, in India one quarter of primary energy came from mainly non-commercial biomass in
2013, but this share stood at 34% in 2000 (IEA, 2015b).
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Population Division 2017 Update. Data on GDP, population and primary energy de-
mand for 1184 scenarios that populate the output and emissions trajectories IPCC 5th
assessment report are from its scenario database IAMC, 2014, version 26 May 2015.
Combining these data series, we construct six ratios and their growth rates, depicted
in Table I. The ratios are for more than 90 per cent of the world’s population, and more
than 99 per cent from the 1990s onwards. We study compound annual growth rates over
s periods, e.g. xˆ =
✓
xt+s
xt
◆ 1
s
  1, with typically s = 10 to average out business cycle
fluctuations.
Table I: Indicators used in the analysis
Ratios
Indicator Construction Level Rate of change
Labor productivity
GDP
Employment
x xˆ
Energy-labor ratio
TPES
Employment
e eˆ
Energy intensity
TPES
GDP
z zˆ
Output per person
GDP
Population
y yˆ
Energy per person
TPES
Population
f fˆ
Production energy-
labor ratio
TPES–residential energy
Employment
q qˆ
3.2 Method
We use a novel combination of graphic and econometric methods to examine the green
growth hypothesis in unprecedented depth. First we consider the levels of labor produc-
tivity and the energy-labor ratio as in (1) to contextualize global productivity growth
and the corresponding energy deepening in the economic history of the past six and a half
decades. This gives insight into possible periodization, and helps interpret subsequent
growth rate results.
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In a second step, we examine cross sections of rates of change across countries as in
(2) by plotting them in the xˆ and eˆ plane. Visual inspection of the angle of the data
cloud gives an idea of the elasticity. A straightforward graphical way to check is to
measure the distance from the 45 degree quadrant halving line. A data scatter parallel
to this line spells unit elasticity would update the green growth hypothesis to non-green
growth.
Following previous empirical studies, we also estimate the elasticity as the slope of
a linear regression, but weight observations according to their importance in the global
sample. The model is
eˆ ⇠ N ( 1 +  2xˆ,  2W 1) (3)
whereW is the diagonal matrix of weights using the share of each country in global energy
demand in the period over which rates of change are computed. Assuming independently
distributed errors we implement a Bayesian weighted linear regression analysis with non-
informative priors, p( 1,  2,  2) / 1/ 2 (Gelman et al., 2014). To capture non-linearities,
we also estimate (3) with locally weighted estimates, “loess” (Cleveland and Devlin, 1988)
and the same matrix of weights, W.9
In a third step, we analyze time series, in order to understand countries’ own elas-
ticities. This has not been done in the literature. We inspect individual countries’
trajectories by plotting them again in the xˆ and eˆ plane. As trajectories appear as a
set of directed acyclic graphs, the direction of each edge gives information about the
green growth hypothesis. Unlike a slope, this also allows distinguishing the direction
for accelerations and decelerations in the growth rate, so it gives a handle on whether
the hypothesis cuts in both directions. We measure directions counterclockwise in an-
gular degrees relative to an edge pointing straight east (zero degrees). Then the green
growth hypothesis predicts edges’ directions at most to lie in angular interval [0 , 45 ]
9The estimates are made using the R version 3.4.2 implementation, sampling from the weighted
linear estimate posterior densities with a self-programmed Gibbs sampler with 10,000 iterations where
the first 2,000 burn-in samples are discarded, and using the function loess() for the loess estimate.
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for countries accelerating growth, and at most in the angular interval [180 , 225 ] for
countries decelerating growth.10 Finding a large number of edges to lie outside these
intervals, in particular if they are near to or above the 45  line, would necessitate re-
vising our prior beliefs about the hypothesis. We also use this method, subsequently,
to contrast the world’s historical trajectory with that projected by IAMs in the current
IPCC assessment report.
Together, the three steps of analysis lay the ground for pronouncing on a stylized
fact about the elasticities and, if necessary, updating our beliefs about the green growth
hypothesis.
4 Results
This section shows the results of applying the methods to country cross sections of growth
rates, and trajectories over time. The aim is to crystallize a stylized fact about growth
rate elasticities. To begin, though, it is helpful to look at the global level relationship be-
tween labor productivity and the energy-labor ratio to understand the possibly changing
historical context.
4.1 Productivity and energy demand since 1950
Although generally positively correlated, the relationship of economic growth and energy
demand since 1950 has gone through heterogeneous phases. In figure 1 we see two
stretches of positive correlation, and one more complicated pattern sandwiched between
them, corresponding two three distinct periods. The first is 1950 through 1973: rapid
productivity growth along with fast energy deepening. These more than two decades
are considered the most successful economic growth period in world history, the “golden
age” (Maddison, 2001, p. 125).
10The idea to analyze directions based on angular degrees is due to Isabella Weber.
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Figure 1: Scatter of annual levels of world average labor productivity and the energy-
labor ratio, 1950-2012. The inset magnifies the period after 1970 and connects observa-
tions by line segments to clarify the non- monotone trajectory.
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The second phase covers 1973 until the millennium, where productivity growth is
more sluggish and periods of energy deepening are interspersed with two periods of la-
bor deepening, as the inset of figure 1 highlights. It is characterized by two big shocks:
the OPEC oil crises and the transition of socialist economies. Both are crucial to under-
standing this period. In 1973, five years after oil overtook coal as the most important
energy source, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an
oil export embargo against the USA and later European countries, that supported Israel
in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. OPEC production curbs reduced world crude production
temporarly by 7.5 percent (Hamilton, 2011), and the quadrupled price of oil is recognized
to have contributed to a productivity growth slowdown in rich countries (Fischer, 1988;
Hamilton, 1983; Jorgenson, 1988). The combined e↵ect of the 1978 Iranian Revolution
and the Iran-Iraq War, that began in 1980, again shrank oil production drastically. In
1981 OPEC output stood one quarter below its pre-revolution 1978 level; world oil pro-
duction only surpassed its 1979 level again in 1993 (consumption already 1989 thanks
to stock depletions); total primary energy production only surpassed the 1979 level in
1984 and demand in 1983, with gas and nuclear picking up part of the demand (cal-
culated from IEA 2016). The slow growth in demand is due substitution away from
energy (Hamilton, 2011), which shows up in figure 1 as the first bout of labor deepening
technical change. On the productivity side, the early 1980s marked the most protracted
global recession since the 1930s (UN DESA, 1984), and while causality is di cult and
not the focus of this paper, high oil prices have been argued to have contributed to the
developing countries’ debt crises Sachs, 1985.
The second shock was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic reforms in the
socialist countries in Eastern Europe and China. In the Soviet Union, output stagnated
in the 1980s, then collapsed dramatically in its successor states during the transition
in the 1990s. Energy demand dropped dramatically, although energy intensities did
not necessarily improve until after 2000 due to equally collapsing output (Cornillie and
Fankhauser, 2004). Due to the high levels of energy intensity of the Eastern European
and Central Asian countries, however, the fall in energy had a larger impact on the
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world series than the growth side; the collapse coincides with the second labor deepening
episode. In contrast, China’s reform approach led to rapid economic growth alongside
a dramatic reduction in energy intensity. The rest of the world grew more strongly
in the 1990s than 1980s, until the 1997 Asian crisis, which shows up as a minor third
labor deepening episode. Moreover, commentators adduce a lasting impact on technical
change of energy e ciency improvements from the high prices in the 1970s/80s through
a ratchet e↵ect (Gately and Huntington, 2002). Clearly, the period 1973-2000 saw a very
di↵erent energy-growth relationship than the golden age.
The third phase covers the years from the millennium. Apart from the 2001 dotcom
crash, the period up to 2007 saw renewed rapid output and energy growth with the
emergence of the BRICS countries. The Great Recession 2008-09, leads to the largest
symmetric reduction in both indicators in the sample, although both bounce back in
the next year. Indeed, this crisis is not typically linked to shocks to energy prices
and/or scarcity, in spite of high oil prices in 2008 (but see Aminu et al., 2018). Since
the Great Recession in 2008-09, productivity growth has been more sluggish and little
energy deepening took place. In spite of the last few observations that are too few to
constitute a trend, the pattern since 2000 looks more similar to that in the golden age’
than the almost three shock decades in between.
This first look at the data shows that the two big shocks in the second phase introduce
variation over time into the series, and at least the second of the two is certainly unique.
It is also important to note that studies of energy and growth with data from the IEA
for 1971 to the early 2000s, or the US Energy Information Agency, starting only in
1980, will see their time series dominated by these two shocks. Our subsequent analysis
will heed these di↵erences in time by considering decadal average growth rates, that
strike a balance between averaging out business cycle fluctuation, and tapering over the
important structural changes between the three phases.
A last point to take away is that the relationship between growth rates does not follow
straightforwardly from a consideration of levels, as it depends on the length as well as
17
the direction of the edges connecting observational nodes. In the following, we study the
relationship between the growth rates of the indicators directly.
4.2 Cross sections
We divide the country data into six roughly decadal periods and examine them for the
green growth hypothesis in cross sections. Figure 2 shows a very strong organization of
the data into a south-west north-east oriented cloud in all six periods. The relationship
also approximates a linear one, with most of the observations near the 45 degree line,
and thus suggesting an elasticity near one. This is true in particular of countries with
large energy demand, marked by larger circles. Any rate of change of labor productivity
supports a range of energy-labor ratio changes, that may be explained primarily by
di↵erences in size, climate, habits, level of income, production structure, energy mix
and self-su ciency (Smil, 2003, p. 75). However, there is an obvious tendency for faster
labor productivity growth rates to accelerate the energy labor ratio rate of change roughly
equally. Clearly, this speaks against green growth. For the data to confirm the green
growth hypothesis, the cloud should be rotated more horizontally.
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Figure 2: Cross-sectional growth rate scatters. Marker area corresponds to total energy
demand. The 45 degree line is dashed.
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Looking more closely, most observations are near the origin, but countries achieving
fast productivity growth cluster in the top right corner of each plot. Japan, the two Ger-
manys and the Soviet Union are examples of in the 1950s and 1960s. Other points during
those periods in the top right are several Southern and Eastern European economies of
the first wave of successful post-war economic development. South Korea exemplifies
the “Asian Tigers” and their successful growth in the 1970s and 1980s. In the bottom
two plots, China stands out for its extraordinary productivity growth in the 1990s and
after 2000. For stagnating countries (zero or negative labor productivity growth) the
constraint on the corresponding labor-energy ratio growth rate seems less binding, as
some countries in recession also experience fast energy deepening.11 Nevertheless most
country observations are organized along a cloud with a slope near one. This betrays a
strong tendency towards unit elasticity, not green growth.
Where exceptions appear, they tend to be countries in the early stages of switching
from biomass to fossil fuels, e.g. in the 1950s, and those that stagnate or decline in any
period. The 1980s show little variation horizontally except for some small countries in
deep depression and with growing energy intensities (many of which Middle Eastern oil
exporters), which coincides with the aftermath of two oil crises – the first shock identified
in the previous subsection. The 1990s reflect the second shock of the disappearance
of socialist governments, where Eastern European, former Soviet transition economies
and China pivot the cloud clockwise.12 However, this anomaly is not sustained in the
subsequent period. Nothing in this visual inspection of the data suggests that faster
growing countries are particularly e↵ective at lowering their energy intensity. In the
next step we consider what elasticities are determined by econometric estimates.
For the weighted linear regression, the posterior density both for slope and intercept
11The Chinese energy demand figures for 1956-60 during the Great Leap Forward are deemed too
high by several commentators (Cheng, 1984, p. 8), and consequently the drop from 1960 to 1970 too
deep. We use UN data based on the Chinese figures here, but exclude China from the linear regression
results Figure 3 in these two decades.
12 Naughton (2007, p. 335) claims significant underreporting of coal demand in China in 1996-2000,
and overreporting in 2000-2004, which, if true, implies that the Chinese observations in plots E and
F should be a convex combination and thus more similar to each other. This would make the 1990s
position less of an outlier.
20
Figure 3: Posterior distributions of of decadal weighted linear estimates and ten year
rolling window estimate of highest posterior density estimates with 1.96 standard devia-
tion whiskers (insets) for slope (top:  2) and intercept (bottom:  1) parameters. Rolling
R2 dashed in top inset.
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Table II: Highest posterior density estimates in each period of the slope parameter  2
for various models. Subscripts indicate the number of observations in the estimate.
Regression 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 00s 2000-07 2007-14
eˆ on xˆ 1.1973 1.1881 0.62104 0.37134 0.53165 0.88165 0.87166 0.80165
yˆ on fˆ 1.0984 1.16100 0.56145 0.35146 0.62176 0.90176 0.87176 0.75180
qˆ on xˆ — — 0.7096 0.48104 0.76130 0.82134 1.07134 0.73135
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is graphed in Figure 3. Starting with the slope (top plot), the posterior density of the
elasticity is mainly above one for the 1950s and 60s, somewhat below for the 70s, low for
the 80s and 90s, and again near unity for the 2000s. The 2000s are further subdivided
into two seven year periods (pre and post Great Recession), which are similar to the
whole period. These results update the previous findings with weights, more detailed
periods and a larger sample. The global elasticity is higher than previous, international
estimates (0.4-0.7) for half the sample, and the low elasticity corresponds mainly to the
shocked decades of the 1980s and 1990s. This is also the first result that reports estimates
for the 1950s and 1960s separately and finds much higher slopes than Hannesson does
for his 50 year cross section.
A rolling window regression of the highest posterior density estimate (equal to maxi-
mum likelihood due to uninformative priors) confirms these estimates for every possible
ten year interval, as shown in the upper inset: the elasticity moves like a wave, from more
di↵use to a sharply peaked near unit elasticity estimates. A parallel wave is described
by the corresponding R2 coe cient, which shows that the high elasticity estimates are
a good fit, while the low elasticity estimates explain the data only very poorly. These
results (including the R2, not shown) carry over to estimates using population instead
of employment or removing non-residential energy, as reported in Table . On the whole,
the data show strong support for a near unit elasticity in those periods where the linear
model has explanatory power, with a striking similarity between the first golden age
period and the most recent period. The golden age and the 2000s are also similar in
their lower intercept estimate (Figure 3 bottom) suggesting that in those periods with a
high elasticity, stagnating countries also displayed labor deepening.
Additional insight particularly into the periods with a low fit comes from the non-
linear loess approach. The loess fit is superimposed on the data in Figure 4, and we
also draw the higest posterior density estimates of the weighted linear model. We can
clearly see that in all data plots, the majority of the locally weighted conditional mean
estimates lies on a straight line with a slope close to one. In particular, in plots C,
22
Figure 4: Growth rate scatters. Loess fit with 0.7 span represented by dots with 1.96
standard deviation whiskers. Weighted linear maximum likelihood fit represented by
solid lines.
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D and E, the periods with a lower slop in the linear fit, we can see that most of the
data actually abides by a unit elasticity, but outliers or a lack of horizontal variation
confound the linear fit (hence the low R2). In C and D, the linear fit is confounded by
little variation plus outliers, while in the 1990s Russia on one end, and China on the
other, pivot the linear fit. The loess plot emphazises that but for the outliers, most data
in these shocked periods is as in the others. The loess strengthens the evidence that
for most of the sample, the elasticity is close to one, while lower slopes are induced by
outliers. This evidence clearly goes against the green growth hypothesis, and in favor to
updating it to a unit elasticity in cross sections.
4.3 Time series
To examine whether countries have achieved green growth in their own growth path,
we start with a visual inspection of large economies. The 7 biggest economies in terms
of energy use in 2014 and all BRICS countries are plotted in figure 5. It is immedi-
ately clear that these countries’s trajectories correspond to an own elasticity of around
unity. Indeed, for several countries lower growth rate nodes have a faster falling energy
intensity. For instance, the plots for the USA and the USSR prior to 1990 are pivoted
anti-clockwise against the 45 degree line, and these countries together accounted for
nearly half the global energy consumption at the time. using the angular vocabulary,
their edges’ directions are outside the green growth intervals, depicted in the middle
panel of figure 5. The one time exception in direction from the 1970s to 1980s when
oil shortages bit, and for the former USSR when it rebounded from depression following
its dissolution cannot obscure the fact that the overall pattern follows a near unit elas-
ticity both for productivity acceleration and deceleration. The result also in the other
countries shows the need to revise the green growth hypothesis for time series.13
These patterns carry over to the other countries in the sample. Figure 6 left plot
13The least regular pattern is displayed by India. India’s relatively agricultural and services oriented
economy (Amirapu and Subramanian, 2015), demands further research into the relationship between
service energy use and economic growth.
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Figure 5: Time series country growth rates in 7 periods (2000-2014 subdivided in two
equilong periods). Each node represents a period’s growth rates; the six edges connect
subsequent periods and show the direction of change. Plots are scaled to countries’
growth rates; the 45 degree line is dotted
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shows the unweighted frequency distribution of angles of the entire sample’s 545 edges.
Most countries move in the intervals [45 , 90 ] and [225 , 270 ], implying slower growth
is greener most of the time. The presence of every direction in the sample indicates
that there are heterogeneous factors across time and countries which impact the growth-
energy trajectory. However two modes are near the unit elasticity. The right plot of
figure 6 makes the marginal distribution of angles conditional on an edge’s origin in the
labor productivity growth dimension. This shows from what level of productivity growth
any edge departed. Most of the countries with near and above unit elastic trajectory
start from a position of healthy productivity growth. Countries moving at an angle of less
than 45  on the contrary tend to start from initial position of stagnation or depression,
such as the countries of the former Soviet Union, Brazil, or (not shown) a number of
other Latin American countries in the 1980s, as well as Arab oil exporting countries. A
similar observation holds for very high angular degrees, which occur also predominantly
in stagnating economies, such as South Africa in the 1980s in Figure 5. This confirms the
observation in the cross sections, that in stagnating countries, there are fewer constraints
on energy deepening, while a tight constraint binds for fast economic growth, which these
trajectories show is incompatible with green growth.
Figure 6: Frequency distribution of the angle of edges indicating the direction of coun-
tries’ change in growth rates (left); and joint distribution of initial rate of productivity
growth and the angle to the next position (right), both plot for full sample.
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We can take this analysis one step further and consider the whole world’s trajectory,
which also permits a comparison with global projections. For comparability, we use
population instead of labor, and we recalculate the IEA’s world energy balance using
the IPCC’s direct equivalent energy accounting method (Krey et al., 2014, p. 1294).
Focus first on the world historical trajectory. Figure 6 shows that the world’s trajectory
operates on an elasticity around one. Faster growth has no impact on energy intensity
improvements. The only possible conclusion from this and the foregoing country analysis
is that the idea of faster economic growth hanging together with more e cient energy
usage in the aggregate, which underpins the green growth hypothesis, is not confirmed
by any historical data. Projections based on extrapolations of past trends should reflect
this.
The rest of the plot concerns such projections. The arrows are the edges connecting
the first two nodes of all reference scenarios of the 5th Assessment Report’s (Clarke
et al., 2014) scenario database. The first node corresponds to historical growth rates
between 2005-2010 with the caveat that the data is from shortly after 2010, and is likely
to have been revised since. The second node at the arrow’s point depicts the projected
growth rates for 2010-2020. The elasticities are low in comparison with historical ones.
Most reference scenarios achieve fast productivity growth like in the golden age, but
combined with a very slow rate of energy deepening, unseen in history and implying
rapid decline in the energy intensity. 88% of BAU scenarios, 239 out of 272, project a
trajectory with an angle below 45  or above 90 . As the top left inset of Figure 7 shows,
30% of reference scenarios even assume a particularly optimistic “super green growth”
direction in the interval [270 , 360 ], whereby the growth trajectory moves to the bottom
right of the plot. As mitigation of climate change measures kick in, that are expected
to deviate more from past trends, the share projecting super green growth rises to 64%
(top right inset histogram).14 Near term reference projections depart significantly from
14From the 1148 scenarios, BAU scenarios were selected by taking those scenario names containing
the strings ‘bau’, ‘ref’, ‘bas’ (as in reference or baseline), and discarding strings that also contain ‘450’
or ‘500’ indicating mitigation policies. The ‘mitigation’ scenarios were selected as the complement of
the BAU scenarios. The total number of scenarios used is less than 1148 because some do not supply
the necessary three data points in all three periods.
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Figure 7: World growth rate trajectory, 1950s through 2007-2014. The diamond is the
2005-10 position, that corresponds to the origins of the transparent arrows showing the
trajectories of growth rates in business as usual (BAU) scenarios integrated assessment
models from 2005-10 to 2010-2020. Insets show the frequency distribution of angles in
BAU (left) and mitigation (right) scenarios over the same period.
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the just documented historical trend, and near term mitigation measures place a heavy
emphasis on even deeper energy intensity reductions, breaking completely with past
trends. The directions become more aligned with the historical record in subsequent
periods (although at unprecedentedly fast rates of energy intensity reductions), but as
developments in the near future are particularly crucial for meeting mitigation targets,
the models’ ability to reflect likely trajectories here is crucial.
5 Discussion
The results from this analysis show that green growth assumptions in models of the
global economy, have no empirical basis in the past growth record. Apparently, past
growth spurts were not predicated on an uptick in the introduction of more productive
and energy e cient machines. Or if they were, then the energy cost of replacing ma-
chines, or a strengthened rebound e↵ect, prevented the translation from per unit energy
e ciency into aggregate energy intensity. Whatever the underlying reasons for this re-
sult, which were not the object of the present investigation, we have a stylized fact that
the productivity elasticity of the energy labor ratio is around one.
The result is a negative one in the sense that there is no technological win-win solution
to reconciling economic growth and climate change, as the unitary elasticity undermines
hopes of energy intensity reductions simply through faster technological progress. It also
concerns projections of growth and energy and by extension green house gas emissions,
as near term future growth is likely to require a similar combination of labor and energy
inputs as that of the past. While there may be hopes for structural changes that upend
the historical correlations in the long-run, these take time to materialize. Due to the
importance of cumulative emissions limits, the short term is also precisely the time span
that matters for implementing climate change mitigation measures (Figueres et al., 2017).
Our juxtaposition of the world’s trajectory with IAM projections suggests that the latter
assume green growth in the near term future, and greater scrutiny of these near term
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results may be a useful exercise to fix realistic expectations particularly about business
as usual scenarios. To the extent that the energy intensity channel is less suited for
reducing green house gas emissions, a bigger onus falls on other channels of mitigation.
One radical alternative is to focus not solely on energy demand, but also on economic
growth. A surprising result in the data showed that it was often slow growth, which
allowed faster reductions in energy deepening. Slower growth would then both accelerate
the decline in energy intensity and reduce the rate at which the total grows, making a
reduction of total energy demand more likely. Such a strategy, with most of projected
growth now in low income countries, would require significant (additional) redistribution
to ensure everyone has a claim to an income su ciently high to participate in global
output’s consumption (Foley, 2012). However, while this seems a topical issue in a world
of high inequalities, international transfers are an intractable political economy problem.
One has to look no farther than the non-ratification by the US of the Kyoto protocol,
where estimates of costs of international transfers (W. Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999) as
well as fear of adverse consequences for domestic industry contributed to its rejection
by Congress (Byrd and Hagel, 1997). The Paris treaty, significantly, binds parties to
their self-announced measures only. Even if transfers were possible, it is unclear how
growth would be “slowed” in an orderly fashion and without creating an economic crisis.
Engineering global low growth seems even less likely than green growth.
The other major channel concerns changing the energy mix. If energy demand cannot
be reduced, it needs to be decarbonized faster. One encouraging fact is that actual
developments of renewable energy supply have been consistently growing faster than
in projections (Metayer et al., 2015). There is a portfolio of policy measures that, if
implemented, could accelerate deployment further (Aldy et al., 2010; Broome and Foley,
2016; Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017). But this route is not devoid of political economy
problems either, as lost revenues from stranded fossil assets also raise knotty questions
about redistribution, with costs estimates in the tens of trillions of US dollars (IRENA,
2017). Nor are problems of energy storage (Larcher and Tarascon, 2014) or material
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availability (Ali et al., 2017) solved. Nevertheless, the present results suggest that a
focus on faster low-carbon energy supply is even more important for mitigating climate
change than current scenarios, with in-built green growth, project.
6 Conclusion
This paper has answered the question whether faster growth is greener. More specifically,
it has investigated whether an additional percentage point labor productivity growth is
accompanied by significantly less than an additional percentage point increase in the
energy-labor ratio, or an elasticity below one, as predicted by the green growth hypoth-
esis. An analysis of a data sample of 180 countries over the period 1950-2014 as well as
for the world as a whole helped update the theoretical prior about green growth: it is
not supported by the data. Instead the paper finds a stylized fact of a unit unit elastic-
ity. This raises di cult questions for near-term climate change mitigation because the
historical data imply that the energy demand reduction channel may prove less capable
of emission reductions than many scenarios assume.
The result has consequences for energy and growth modeling. First, we must stress
that the stylized fact 1.c in Csereklyei et al. (2016, p. 249) that “[t]he growth rate
of energy intensity is negatively correlated with the growth rate of income” should be
rephrased to: the growth rate of energy intensity is uncorrelated with the growth rate
of income per capita. This rephrasing does not a↵ect the validity of the authors’ other
stylized facts about level relationships. Second, the new information should be incor-
porated into projections of near term economic growth and green house gas emissions,
especially in integrated assessment models.
For further research, it would be useful to explore the e↵ect of a unit elasticity also in
analytical models, and ways of reducing it.15 To do so, the models need to be informed
by empirical analysis of the relationship’s drivers. One obvious step is to examine how
15Two models that already incorporate non-green growth are Rezai et al. (2018) and Dafermos et al.
(2017), the latter restricted to its “conventional capital”.
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capital, a complement of energy inputs (Csereklyei et al., 2016), and energy prices, nega-
tively correlated with growth in energy use (Hannesson, 2009), play into the relationship.
Another is to revisit micro-level studies and explicitly analyze drivers of the interplay
between accelerations in growth and energy demand. Overall, the results here point to
a gap in our understanding of correlations in growth rates, which have been neglected
in favor of levels in the research on energy and economic activity.
References
Aldy, J. E. et al. (2010). “Designing Climate Mitigation Policy.” In: Journal of Economic
Literature 48.4, pp. 903–934.
Ali, S. H. et al. (2017). “Mineral supply for sustainable development requires resource
governance.” In: Nature 543, p. 367.
Aminu, N., D. Meenagh, and P. Minford (2018). “The role of energy prices in the Great
Recession – A two-sector model with unfiltered data.” In: Energy Economics 71,
pp. 14–34.
Amirapu, A. and A. Subramanian (2015). “Manufacturing or Services? An Indian Il-
lustration of a Development Dilemma.” In: Center for Global Development Working
Paper Series No. 409.
Ang, B. W. (1986). “A method for estimating non-commercial energy consumption in
the household sector of developing countries.” In: Energy 11.3, pp. 315–325.
Ang, B. W. and N. Liu (2006). “A cross-country analysis of aggregate energy and carbon
intensities.” In: Energy Policy 34.15, pp. 2398–2404.
Benthem, A. A. van (2015). “Energy Leapfrogging.” In: Journal of the Association of
Environmental and Resource Economists 2.1, pp. 93–132.
Berndt, E., C. Kolstad, and J.-K. Lee (1993). “Measuring the Energy E ciency and
Productivity Impacts of Embodied Technical Change.” In: The Energy Journal 14.1,
pp. 33–55.
32
Bolt, J. et al. (2018). Rebasing ’Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of
long-run economic development. Tech. rep. Maddison Project Working Paper 10.
British Petroleum (2017). BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2017. Tech. rep.
London: British Petroleum.
– (2018). No 2018 BP Energy Outlook. Tech. rep.
Broome, J. and D. K. Foley (2016). “A World Climate Bank.” In: Institutions for Future
Generations. Ed. by A. Gosseries and I. Gonza´lez-Ricoy. Oxford University Press,
pp. 156–169.
Burke, M., S. M. Hsiang, and E. Miguel (2015). “Global non-linear e↵ect of temperature
on economic production.” In: Nature 527.7577, pp. 235–239.
Burmeister, E. and A. R. Dobell (1970). Mathematical Theories of Economic Growth.
New York and London: Macmillan.
Byrd, R. and C. Hagel (1997). S.Res.98 - A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate
regarding the conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any interna-
tional agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. url: https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-
congress/senate-resolution/98.
Cheng, C.-y. (1984). The Demand and Supply of Primary Energy in Mainland China.
Taipei: Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research.
Clarke, L. et al. (2014). “Assessing transformation pathways.” In: Climate Change 2014:
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Ed. by O. Edenhofer
et al. Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp. 413–510.
Cleveland, W. S. and S. J. Devlin (1988). “Locally Weighted Regression: An Approach
to Regression Analysis by Local Fitting.” In: Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation 83.403, pp. 596–610.
Conference Board (2016). The Conference Board Total Economy Database TM. url:
https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/.
33
Cornillie, J. and S. Fankhauser (2004). “The energy intensity of transition countries.”
In: Energy Economics 26.3, pp. 283–295.
Csereklyei, Z., M. d. M. Rubio-Varas, and D. I. Stern (2016). “Energy and Economic
Growth: The Stylized Facts.” In: Energy Journal 37.2, pp. 223–255.
Cullen, J. M. and J. M. Allwood (2010). “Theoretical e ciency limits for energy conver-
sion devices.” In: Energy 35.5, pp. 2059–2069.
Cullen, J. M., J. M. Allwood, and E. H. Borgstein (2011). “Reducing energy demand:
What are the practical limits?” In: Environmental Science and Technology 45.4, pp. 1711–
1718.
Dafermos, Y., M. Nikolaidi, and G. Galanis (2017). “A stock-flow-fund ecological macroe-
conomic model.” In: Ecological Economics 131, pp. 191–207.
Deaton, A. and A. Heston (2008). “Understanding PPPs and PPP-based national ac-
counts.” In: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2.4, pp. 1–35.
Dellink, R. et al. (2017). “Long-term economic growth projections in the Shared Socioe-
conomic Pathways.” In: Global Environmental Change 42, pp. 200–214.
Desai, A. V. (1978). “India’s Energy Consumption Composition and Trends.” In: Energy
Policy 6.3, pp. 217–230.
Energy Information Agency (2018). International Energy Statistics. url: https://www.
eia.gov/beta/international/.
Feenstra, R. C., R. Inklaar, and M. P. Timmer (2015). “The next generation of the penn
world table.” In: American Economic Review 105.10, pp. 3150–3182.
Figueres, C. et al. (2017). “Three years to safeguard our climate.” In: Nature 546,
pp. 593–595.
Fischer, S. (1988). “Symposium on the Slowdown in Productivity Growth.” In: The
Journal of Economic Perspectives 2.4, pp. 3–7.
Foley, D. K. (2012). “Dilemmas of economic growth.” In: Eastern Economic Journal
38.3, pp. 283–295.
34
Fouquet, R. (2009). “A brief history of energy.” In: International Handbook of the Eco-
nomics of Energy. Ed. by J. Evans and L. Hunt. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar.
– (2016). “Path dependence in energy systems and economic development.” In: Nature
Energy 1.16098.
G20 (2017). G20 Leaders’ declaration - shaping an interconnected world. Tech. rep. July,
pp. 1–15. url: https://www.g20.org/Content/EN/%7B%5C_%7DAnlagen/G20/G20-
leaders-declaration.pdf?%7B%5C_%7D%7B%5C_%7Dblob=publicationFile%7B%
5C&%7Dv=2.
Gately, D. and H. G. Huntington (2002). “The Asymmetric E↵ects of Changes in Price
and Income on Energy and Oil Demand.” In: The Energy Journal 23.1.
Gelman, A. et al. (2014). Bayesian Data Analysis. 3rd editio. London: Chapman and
Hall/CRC.
Gillingham, K., R. G. Newell, and W. A. Pizer (2008). “Modeling endogenous techno-
logical change for climate policy analysis.” In: Energy Economics 30.6, pp. 2734–2753.
Gillingham, K., D. Rapson, and G. Wagner (2016). “The Rebound E↵ect and Energy
E ciency Policy.” In: Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 10.1, pp. 68–88.
Goldemberg, J. (1998). “Leapfrog energy technologies.” In: Energy Policy 26.10, pp. 729–
741.
Hamilton, J. D. (1983). “Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War II.” In: Journal
of Political Economy 91.2, pp. 228–248.
Hamilton, J. D. (2011). “Historical Oil Shocks.” In: NBER Working Paper Series No.
16790.
Hannesson, R. (2002). “Energy use and GDP growth, 1950-97.” In: OPEC Review 26.3,
pp. 215–233.
– (2009). “Energy and GDP growth.” In: International Journal of Energy Sector Man-
agement 3.2, pp. 157–170.
IAMC (2014). AR5 Scenario Database. url: https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-
apps/ene/AR5DB/.
35
IEA (2015a). Energy and Climate Change. Paris: International Energy Agency.
– (2015b). India Energy Outlook. Paris: International Energy Agency.
– (2016). World Energy Balances: World Summary Energy Balances, 1960-2015. Tech.
rep. UK Data Service.
– (2017). Key World Energy Statistics. Tech. rep. Paris: International Energy Agency.
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2012). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Esti-
mates by Country 1950-2015. Seattle, US: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
(IHME).
IPCC (1991). Climate Change: The Response Strategies. Tech. rep. World Meteorological
Organization and United Nations Environment Program.
IRENA (2017). Stranded assets and renewables: how the energy transition a↵ects the
value of energy reserves, buildings and capital stock. Tech. rep. International Renewable
Energy Agency.
Jevons, W. S. (1865). The Coal Question. London.
Jin, W. and Z. X. Zhang (2016). “On the mechanism of international technology di↵usion
for energy technological progress.” In: Resource and Energy Economics 46, pp. 39–61.
Johansen, L. (1959). “Substitution versus Fixed Production Coe cients in the Theory
of Economic Growth: A Synthesis.” In: Econometrica 27.2, pp. 157–176.
Jorgenson, D. W. (1988). “Productivity and Postwar U.S. Economic Growth.” In: The
Journal of Economic Perspectives II.4, pp. 23–41.
Kander, A., P. Malanima, and P. Warde (2013). Power to the people : energy in Europe
over the last five centuries. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Krey, V. et al. (2014). “Annex II: Metrics and Methodology.” In: Climate Change 2014:
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Ed. by O. Edenhofer
et al.
Larcher, D. and J.-M. Tarascon (2014). “Towards greener and more sustainable batteries
for electrical energy storage.” In: Nature Chemistry 7, p. 19.
36
Lennox, J. A. and J. Witajewski-Baltvilks (2017). “Directed technical change with
capital-embodied technologies: Implications for climate policy.” In: Energy Economics
67, pp. 400–409.
Luzzati, T. and M. Orsini (2009). “Investigating the energy-environmental Kuznets
curve.” In: Energy 34.3, pp. 291–300.
Maddison, A. (2001). The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD.
Majumdar, D. and S. Kar (2017). “Does technology di↵usion help to reduce emission
intensity? Evidence from organized manufacturing and agriculture in India.” In: Re-
source and Energy Economics 48, pp. 30–41.
Marangoni, G. et al. (2017). “Sensitivity of projected long-term CO2 emissions across
the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways.” In: Nature Climate Change 7.2, pp. 113–117.
Mazzucato, M. and G. Semieniuk (2017). “Public financing of innovation: New ques-
tions.” In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33.1.
Metayer, M., C. Breyer, and H.-J. Fell (2015). The projections for the future and quality
in the past of the World Energy Outlook for solar PV and other renewable energy
technologies. Tech. rep. Energy Watch Group (Berlin) and Lappeenranta University of
Technology (Finland). url: http://energywatchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/EWG%7B%5C_%7DWEO-Study%7B%5C_%7D2015.pdfs%7B%5C_%7D.pdf.
Nakicenovic, N., A. Grubler, and A. McDonald (1998). Global Energy Perspectives. Cam-
bridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Naughton, B. (2007). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA,
and London: MIT Press.
Nilsson, L. J. (1993). “Energy intensity trends in 31 industrial and developing countries
1950-1988.” In: Energy 18.4, pp. 309–322.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2007). “Alternative measures of output in global economic-environmental
models: Purchasing power parity or market exchange rates?” In: Energy Economics
29.3, pp. 349–372.
37
Nordhaus, W. D. and Z. Yang (1996). “A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model of
alternative climate-change strategies.” In: American Economic Review 86.4, pp. 741–
765.
Nordhaus, W. and J. G. Boyer (1999). “Requiem for Kyoto: An Economic Analysis of
the Kyoto Protocol.” In: The Energy Journal Volume 20, pp. 93–130.
Ocampo, J. A., C. Rada, and L. Taylor (2009). Growth and Policy in Developing Coun-
tries. New York and Chichester: Cambridge University Press.
Pant, H. M. and B. S. Fisher (2007). “Alternative measures of output in global economic-
environmental models: Purchasing power parity or market exchange rates? - Com-
ment.” In: Energy Economics 29.3, pp. 375–389.
Planning Commission (1999). 9th Five Year Plan. New Delhi: Government of India.
Popp, D. (2010). “Innovation and Climate Policy.” In: Annual Review of Resource Eco-
nomics 2.1, pp. 275–298.
Rezai, A., L. Taylor, and D. K. Foley (2018). “Economic Growth, Income Distribution,
and Climate Change.” In: Ecological Economics 146, pp. 164–172.
Romer, P. M. (1990). “Endogenous Technological Change.” In: Journal of Political Econ-
omy 98.5, Part 2, S71–S102.
Sachs, J. D. (1985). “External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in Latin America
and East Asia.” In: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1985.2, pp. 523–573.
Salter, W. E. G. (1960). Productivity and Technical Change. London and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Semieniuk, G., D. K. Foley, and L. Taylor (2018). “The simple arithmetic of economic
growth and energy demand.” In: Forthcoming SOAS Econ Working Paper Series.
Smil, V. (2003). Energy at the Crossroads. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.
Solow, R. M. (1960). “Investment and Technical Progress.” In: Mathematical Methods
in the Social Sciences 1959. Ed. by J. Arrow, Kenneth, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Sorrell, S., J. Dimitropoulos, and M. Sommerville (2009). “Empirical estimates of the
direct rebound e↵ect: A review.” In: Energy Policy 37.4, pp. 1356–1371.
38
Stapleton, L., S. Sorrell, and T. Schwanen (2017). “Peak car and increasing rebound: A
closer look at car travel trends in Great Britain.” In: Transportation Research Part D
53, pp. 217–233.
Sterner, T. (1990). “Energy E ciency and Capital Embodied Technical Change : The
Case of Mexican Cement Manufacturing.” In: The Energy Journal 11.2, pp. 155–167.
Sue Wing, I. (2008). “Explaining the declining energy intensity of the U.S. economy.”
In: Resource and Energy Economics 30.1, pp. 21–49.
Taylor, L. (2009). “Energy Productivity, Labor Productivity, and Global Warming.” In:
Twenty-First Century Macroeconomics. Responding to the Climate Challenge. Ed. by
J. Harris and N. Goodwin. Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
UN (1952). “World Energy Supplies in Selected Years, 1929-1950.” In: United Nations
Statistical Papers Series J No. 1.
– (2016). The United Nations Energy Statistics Database. New York: United Nations
Energy Statistics Division.
– (2018). Poverty eradication, inclusive growth focus of UN Social Development Com-
mission’s 2018 session. url: http : / / www . un . org / sustainabledevelopment /
blog/2018/01/poverty- eradication- inclusive- growth- focus- un- social-
development-commissions-2018-session/.
UN DESA (1984). World Economic Survey 1984. New York: United Nations.
UNEP (2016). The Emissions Gap Report 2016. Nairobi: United Nations Environment
Program. url: http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf.
Wolfram, C., O. Shelef, and P. Gertler (2012). “How Will Energy Demand Develop in
the Developing World?” In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 26.1, pp. 119–138.
World Energy Council (2016). “The Grand Transition.” In: World Energy Council. url:
https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/World-Energy-
Scenarios-2016%7B%5C_%7DFull-Report.pdf.
Worrell, E., L. Bernstein, et al. (2009). “Industrial energy e ciency and climate change
mitigation.” In: Energy E ciency 2.2, pp. 109–123.
39
Worrell, E. and G. Biermans (2005). “Move over! Stock turnover, retrofit and industrial
energy e ciency.” In: Energy Policy 33.7, pp. 949–962.
Worrell, E., N. Martin, and L. Price (2000). “Potentials for energy e ciency improvement
in the US cement industry.” In: Energy 25, pp. 1189–1214.
Zon, A. van and I. H. Yetkiner (2003). “An Endogenous Growth Model with Embodied
Technical Change without Scale E↵ects.” In: Resource and Energy Economics 25,
pp. 81–103.
40
